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JULY 2020

POLICY BRIEF
Efects of Welfare Time Limits
Gabrielle Pepin
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n Several states imposed time limits
for welfare receipt in the wake of the
Great Recession.
n Stricter time limits decreased
welfare participation by 22 percent
and transfer income by 6 percent.
n The time limits tend to decrease
earnings in states without generous
benefits at baseline.
n Separation from work and welfare
diminishes families’ access to financial
resources.

T
he Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) established the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program

within the United States, replacing the previous welfare program of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of TANF was that
it mandated a lifetime limit of 60 months for federal cash assistance. States, however,
reserve the right to set stricter time limits or to continue to fund TANF caseloads beyond
60 months using their own funds. During the 2010s, several states imposed TANF
time limits for the frst time or made existing time limits more stringent. Te reforms
counted families’ existing months on welfare, so families beyond the time limit could
lose eligibility and access immediately. As TANF requires most benefciaries to work (or
prepare for work), families losing eligibility may also lose incentives to fnd employment.
Comparing states that changed time limits to those that did not, I fnd that stricter
time limits decreased annual TANF participation by 22 percent and annual transfer
income by 6 percent among single mothers without college degrees, who make up
most of the TANF population. Moreover, stricter TANF time limits did not increase
employment or earnings among single mothers in states without generous programs
at baseline. My fndings suggest that TANF work requirements can efectively increase
work participation and that removing TANF eligibility may reduce this participation.
Consequently, decreased TANF generosity diminishes these families’ access to fnancial
resources.

TANF Background

For additional details, see the working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/329/.

TANF is a means-tested cash transfer program for families with children. Income,
assets, and household size determine households’ eligibility for monthly cash assistance.
States set all policy parameters and administer TANF payments. However, they
receive about half of their funding from the federal government if they meet spending
requirements and have specifed portions of their TANF caseloads engaged in workrelated activities, such as employment and job training. States may not allocate federal
funding to children or adults in households that have received TANF for 60 months or
more. However, as mentioned above, states may continue to fund TANF cases beyond 60
months using their own funds, or they may implement shorter TANF time limits. While
a few states allow all benefciaries to remain on TANF indefnitely, states more ofen
grant certain groups of individuals exemptions from or extensions to their time-limit
policies. For instance, many states extend time limits for victims of domestic violence
and individuals who are ill or incapacitated.
Arizona, Kansas, Maine, and Michigan—henceforth, “the analysis states”—changed
their lifetime TANF time limits between 2010 and 2016. Arizona shortened its time limit
from 60 to 12 months gradually between July 2010 and July 2016. Similarly, Kansas,
which originally had a 60-month time limit, phased in a 24-month time limit between
November 2011 and July 2016. Maine, which previously had no time limit, implemented
a 60-month time limit in January 2012. Michigan implemented a 60-month time limit
for the frst time in 2011. In all these cases, the new time-limit policies were announced
within a year of their implementation. Individuals who had already reached the states’
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All individuals in
households that had
reached their time limits,
including children, were
removed from TANF
shortly afer time limits
were implemented.

new time limits were then notifed. All individuals in households that had reached their
time limits, including children, were removed from TANF shortly afer the time limits
were implemented.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the analysis states implemented stricter TANF
time-limit policies in response to economic difculties, which became particularly
acute in the absence of federal supports afer the Great Recession. Specifcally, during
Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010, states could receive additional federal TANF funds through
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which allocated $5
billion toward emergency TANF spending. But when ARRA appropriations ended in
2011, some state governments found themselves struggling to fund TANF caseloads. In
particular, the analysis states were experiencing budget shortfalls as they changed their
time-limit policies (Olif, Mai, and Palacios 2012). For example, the Arizona Department
of Economic Security’s budget was cut by over 31 percent between the beginning
of Fiscal Year 2009 and the end of Fiscal Year 2010 (Brewer and Young 2013), and
Michigan forecast nearly $75 million in cost savings because of time-limit case closures
during Fiscal Year 2012 (Carley 2011). In light of these budget problems and the high
unemployment rates in the wake of the Great Recession, state fnancial issues, rather than
lack of need for safety-net benefts, seem to have driven states to change their TANF time
limits.
Time limits are not the only margin along which states can infuence TANF program
design. Each state sets its own income eligibility requirements, beneft levels, and
work requirements for recipients. For example, many states require recipients without
very young children to engage in work-related activities, such as employment and job
training, for at least 30 hours a week. TANF generosity varies considerably across the
analysis states. As of 2009, three-person families with up to $1,023 in monthly income
could be eligible for TANF benefts in Maine, but only those with less than $600 in
monthly income could be eligible for benefts in Arizona and Kansas. Maximum monthly
benefts for three-person families were $278 in Arizona, $429 in Kansas, $485 in Maine,
and $492 in Michigan. In addition, Maine, Kansas, and Michigan exempted parents of
children 12, 6, and 3 months or younger, respectively, from work requirements, while
Arizona did not exempt any parents from work requirements on the basis of the age of
their children.

Efects on TANF Participation
I use state-level administrative data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and household-level survey data from the American Community Survey
to analyze trends in TANF participation from 2007 through 2016. Te administrative
data document the number of adult TANF recipients for each state by month, and the
survey data document individuals’ demographics and economic outcomes, including
TANF benefts within the past year. I compare how TANF participation varies over
time between the analysis states and the rest of the country through two approaches:
1) synthetic control and 2) diference-in-diferences. Both approaches attempt to make
the comparison states similar to the analysis states during the period before the policy
change—tighter time limits—takes efect, in order to control for other factors that could
afect the outcomes.
Figure 1 shows the estimated efect of stricter time-limit policies on monthly adult
TANF receipt, using the HHS data for Arizona, Kansas, and Michigan. (I do not display
results from Maine because of issues with its HHS data. See the working paper for more
details.) In the top lef panel of Figure 1, the solid line shows, by month, the number of
adult TANF recipients per 100 adult residents of Arizona, which hovered around 0.4
before Arizona shortened its time limit beginning in 2010. Afer the policy change, the
ratio decreases to less than 0.3, and it continues to decrease to less than 0.1 by 2016. Te
dashed line, constructed using data from the comparison states, approximates TANF
participation in Arizona had the state not shortened its time limit. Although the solid
2
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Figure 1 Tighter Time Limits on TANF Eligibility Reduce Caseloads in Arizona,
Kansas, and Michigan
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NOTE: Graphs show the number of TANF recipients per 100 adults by month in analysis states and their synthetic
control groups.
SOURCE: Author’s estimates using data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Ofce of Family
Assistance.

and dashed lines agree quite closely before 2010, they diverge immediately afer Arizona
changes its time limit, and by 2016 the gap implies a 48 percent decrease in Arizona’s
TANF participation from what it would have been with no change in time limits.
Te top right and bottom lef panels of Figure 1 show the estimated efects of stricter
time-limit policies in Kansas and Michigan, respectively. Similar to the 48 percent
decrease in Arizona, monthly TANF participation decreases by 30 percent in Kansas and
39 percent in Michigan.
To isolate the population afected by TANF policies, I use the survey data to limit
the sample to single mothers without college degrees, who make up most of the TANF
population. I fnd that stricter time limits decrease annual TANF participation within
this group by 22 percent.

Efects on Access to Financial Resources
Given the dramatic decreases in TANF participation brought on by stricter time
limits, I also investigate the impact on fnancial resources through the efects on work,
income, and participation in other safety-net programs among single mothers without
college degrees. I fnd that stricter time-limit policies decrease annual TANF benefts by
30 percent. Consistent with the eligibility link between TANF and SNAP (food stamps),
participation in the latter program also decreases—in this case by 6 percent. Te efects
on work vary across the analysis states: employment increases by 2.7 percentage points
in Maine, but stricter time limits have virtually no efect on employment in Arizona and
Kansas, and they decrease employment by 3.1 percentage points in Michigan.
Tese diferent employment efects could result from a few factors. First,
macroeconomic conditions may afect the ability of TANF recipients to work more as
3
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When we jointly consider
the impacts on work,
taxes, and SNAP benefts,
however, it appears that
stricter time limits tend to
decrease overall income
for afected households.

TANF generosity decreases. For example, Michigan experienced particularly widespread
unemployment during the Great Recession. It is plausible that TANF-vulnerable women
in Michigan tried to work more afer the TANF time limit took efect, but that they were
unable to secure jobs. Second, preexisting diferences in TANF policies may interact
with caseload demographics in determining employment efects. For instance, as of
2009, Maine’s TANF program had no time limit, a high maximum income threshold
for eligibility, a relatively generous maximum beneft, and the most generous work
exemptions of the four analysis states for parents of very young children. Tis suggests
that TANF-vulnerable mothers in Maine likely had stronger underlying labor market
potential than their counterparts in the other analysis states. When we jointly consider
the impacts on work, taxes, and SNAP benefts, however, it appears that stricter time
limits tend to decrease overall income for afected households.

Policy Implications
To the extent that work, income, and program participation proxy for access to
fnancial resources, my results imply that policymakers should consider macroeconomic
conditions and caseload demographics before altering TANF policies such as time limits.
While stricter time limits may lead to substantial government cost savings through
decreased TANF (and SNAP) participation, such changes may also substantially reduce
the living standards of low-income families. In states without generous TANF programs,
welfare recipients ofen have poor work prospects to begin with, especially during times
of widespread unemployment. Removing such individuals from TANF likely inhibits
their access to fnancial resources and decreases their overall well-being.
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